For years, Bernie Madoff, all-around nice guy, pulled billions of
dollars of foreign and domestic money into his investment fund. His
lure? He promised the implausible combination of good returns and low
risk—and people believed him.
Painfully, the allegations of fraud surrounding the Madoff affair
are also exposing the fundamental fallacy of the global economy. Like
Madoff's trusting investors, the rest of the world was willing to
assume that the U.S. economy as a whole was a low-risk, good-return
investment. This belief drove the entire structure of global trade and
finance for the past 10 years. And when the subprime crisis showed this
assumption of low risk to be false, the financial crisis resulted.
Consider this: Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the rest
of the world has been willing to lend money to finance the U.S.'s huge
and growing trade deficit. Not just small amounts of cash either: over
the past decade, the U.S. borrowed a cumulative total of $5 trillion
from foreigners at relatively low interest rates.
Why were foreigners so generous?
Without this flow of easy money into the U.S., globalization
in its current form would not have been possible. The U.S. was the
consumer of last resort, absorbing cars from Germany and Japan,
electronics from Taiwan and Korea, and clothes and furniture from
China. The earth was flat, and why not? Pluck a laptop from Taiwan and
pay for it with a home equity loan, which—if you trace back the
connections—was at least partly funded with foreign money, too.
The big unanswered question, for years, was why this money flow
persisted. Why the heck were foreign investors willing to lend the U.S.
such large amounts of money on such good terms? Economists and
journalists spun out hypothesis after hypothesis (we'll see more
below), but there was no agreement on why.
Now we see what happened. Wall Street firms—big operators like Lehman
and relatively small fish like Madoff—told foreign investors they could
put their money into the U.S.—the world's safest economy—and still make
decent returns. Madoff, of course, appears to have lied. He allegedly
ran an investment scam that has resulted in billions of dollars of
losses reported around the world, including $4 billion in Switzerland
and $3 billion in Spain.
exporting 'low risk' Derivatives
But it wasn't simply Madoff. The Wall Street boom of recent years was built, as far as I can figure out, on selling the low-risk story to foreign investors.
In fact, most of the financial innovations of recent years were about
making investments in the U.S. 'safer' for foreign investors. The
enormous growth of foreign exchange derivatives enabled those abroad to
protect their U.S. investments from exchange-rate fluctuations. The
sudden increase in credit default swaps
could be used to protect foreign bond investors from problems with
individual countries. And collateralized debt obligations, which could
be divided into high-risk and low-risk pieces, increased the supply of
low-risk investments to be sold outside the U.S.
This low-risk, good-return story attracted investors from around the world. One example: Lehman sold $2 billion in 'mini-bonds' to Hong Kong investors, including many retirees.
However, the low-risk, good-return story simply wasn't true, for two
key reasons: First, the U.S. economy was supposed to be on the cutting
edge of innovation. Innovation through technological change, by nature,
is a very risky activity. Sometimes it pays off and sometimes it
doesn't. If the investment in innovation pays off, the economy booms,
as it did during the second half of the 1990s.
U.S. Regulation Failed
But innovation has fallen short in recent years. Biotech and nanotech still have not come to fruition, and alternative energy
is moving slowly. As a result, the U.S. economy has fallen short of
expectations. The income isn't there, and the debt just piles up.
The second reason why the low-risk, good-return story wasn't true:
the breakdown of regulation. And that's where we come back to the
alleged Madoff scam. His was no complicated global securitization,
based on black-box rocket science. Instead, it appears to be a good
old-fashioned Ponzi scheme, enabled by a lack of government
supervision.
What comes next? The fallacy is punctured. Globalization will be
seen as what it is—a game with risks that can't be wished away. And
U.S. prosperity will depend on the success or failure of its ability to
innovate—not its ability to tell an implausible story to foreign
investors.